The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism in scientific ex...
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct...
This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put ...
An account of scientific explanation is presented according to which (1) scientific explanation cons...
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific e...
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanation...
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesi...
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism...
It is tempting to think that if an outcome had some probability of not occurring, then we cannot exp...
In order to explain scientific practices, a study of science must organize its method of explanatio...
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a thre...
In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-causal explanations in philosoph...
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a thre...
In this paper I argue for contrastivism about reasons. Just as contrastivism about causation and kno...
This book develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons ...
Carl Hempel (1965) argued that probabilistic hypotheses are limited in what they can explain. He con...
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct...
This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put ...
An account of scientific explanation is presented according to which (1) scientific explanation cons...
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific e...
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanation...
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesi...
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism...
It is tempting to think that if an outcome had some probability of not occurring, then we cannot exp...
In order to explain scientific practices, a study of science must organize its method of explanatio...
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a thre...
In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-causal explanations in philosoph...
Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a thre...
In this paper I argue for contrastivism about reasons. Just as contrastivism about causation and kno...
This book develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons ...
Carl Hempel (1965) argued that probabilistic hypotheses are limited in what they can explain. He con...
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct...
This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put ...
An account of scientific explanation is presented according to which (1) scientific explanation cons...