We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995-2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.</p
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
Due to principal-agency frictions, firms tend to engage in moral hazard behaviour. The banking indus...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous struct...
To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous struct...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administratio...
One of questions discussed in the light of current financial crisis is the problem bailouts in banki...
One of questions discussed in the light of current financial crisis is the problem bailouts in banki...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
We examine the moral hazard effects of bank recapitalizations by assessing the impact of the U.S. TA...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
Due to principal-agency frictions, firms tend to engage in moral hazard behaviour. The banking indus...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking ...
To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous struct...
To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous struct...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administratio...
One of questions discussed in the light of current financial crisis is the problem bailouts in banki...
One of questions discussed in the light of current financial crisis is the problem bailouts in banki...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
We examine the moral hazard effects of bank recapitalizations by assessing the impact of the U.S. TA...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
How does bank distress impact their customers’ probability of default and trade credit availability?...
Due to principal-agency frictions, firms tend to engage in moral hazard behaviour. The banking indus...