The principle of separation of powers in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutionalorganization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found inthe jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it,nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions. Withins the context, the primary aspiration of the separation of powers lies in the protection of the judicial and legislative branches against the executive. The European Court of Human Rights shares this view. Even if the principle of the separation of powers is not a principle enunciated by the Court, at least not with the required precision, it is, nonetheless, a principle already present in the Strasbourg jurisprudence and its future cannot but beregarded as promising