The Right to Silence in the EU Directive 2016/343 on the Strengthening of Certain Aspects of the Presumption of Innocence from the Perspective of Polish Criminal Proceedings

The right to remain silent is one of the most fundamental principles of domestic and international criminal law. It’s is also closely related to the presumption of innocence. As the responsibility is placed on the prosecution to prove the guilt of a person it follows that the accused should not be forced to assist the prosecution by being forced to speak. The right to remain silent expresses the individual’s right not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. Its core component is the freedom to choose whether or not to give answers to individual questions or to provide explanations. To use against the suspected silence under police questioning and his refusal to testify during trial amounted to subverting the presumption of innocence and the onus of proof resulting from that presumption: it is for the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt without any assistance from the latter being required. This article has to objectives. Firstly, to interpret the right to remain silent in the light to of the Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceeding. Secondly, the Directive 2016/343 can be used as reference to evaluate a degree to which Polish legal solutions conform to the Directive in question, giving rise to several postulates in that matter. The analysis will also include shortages and problems resulting from imperfect Polish criminal process in that field.The current article is financed by the National Science Center as a part of research project no. 2013/11/B/HS5/04119, entitled Standard of protection for the right to silence in the criminal process. 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