Structural separation- unlocking or destroying value?

The past four years have seen renewed interest in the role that structural remedies could play in shaping telecommunications markets. In the United Kingdom the threatened structural separation of British Telecom (BT) formed the starting point for a lengthy review by the regulator Ofcom which culminated in agreement on the implementation of the lesser remedy of functional separation. Similarly the European Union\u27s 2006 regulatory review initially focused on structural separation as an answer to alleged anti competitive behaviour by incumbents but finally opted for the UK model of functional separation. Yet despite the rejection of structural separation in these markets it has emerged as a key issue in the planned National Broadband Network (NBN). Proponents of structural separation suggest that it would not only enhance value to consumers through heightened competition, it would increase shareholder value in incumbents as network assets are revalued and other divisions are spun off. Such confidence in Australia in the ability of structural separation to generate value appears to deny the practical experience internationally and ignores the growing body of literature which calls for regulatory reform to enable broadband rollout based on less prescriptive ex ante regulation