[Excerpt] Using data from the 1992–95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-profits to base promotions on job performance or merit; nonprofits were less likely to use output-contingent incentive contracts to motivate workers; and the observed difference in promotion rates between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors was more pronounced for high-skilled than for lo...
In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on indiv...
Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare industry ...
open2noWe study optimal non-linear contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive servic...
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors do...
Although the nonprofit sector is enormous, we know little about how workers there are compensated. T...
This article examines whether nonprofit executive pay patterns are consistent with the espoused soci...
High performing employees in the nonprofit sector can gain better compensation, benefits, and incent...
[Excerpt] Managerial pay is a controversial and often studied subject in economics, sociology, accou...
This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using pane...
We develop a theoretical model in which for-profit and nonprofit employers compete to hire a worker ...
Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare industry ...
Two competing theories argue that the nonprofit sector pays differently: Nonprofit employees may acc...
Nonprofit organizations\u27 managers face challenges in creating nonmonetary rewards to increase the...
Nonprofit workers earn less on average than for-profit workers. Existing empirical work leaves open ...
In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on indiv...
In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on indiv...
Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare industry ...
open2noWe study optimal non-linear contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive servic...
Using data from the 1992-95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors do...
Although the nonprofit sector is enormous, we know little about how workers there are compensated. T...
This article examines whether nonprofit executive pay patterns are consistent with the espoused soci...
High performing employees in the nonprofit sector can gain better compensation, benefits, and incent...
[Excerpt] Managerial pay is a controversial and often studied subject in economics, sociology, accou...
This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using pane...
We develop a theoretical model in which for-profit and nonprofit employers compete to hire a worker ...
Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare industry ...
Two competing theories argue that the nonprofit sector pays differently: Nonprofit employees may acc...
Nonprofit organizations\u27 managers face challenges in creating nonmonetary rewards to increase the...
Nonprofit workers earn less on average than for-profit workers. Existing empirical work leaves open ...
In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on indiv...
In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on indiv...
Studies on the nonprofit pay differential find that nonprofit workers in the child daycare industry ...
open2noWe study optimal non-linear contracts offered by two firms competing for the exclusive servic...