The Effect of Inter-institutional Rules on the Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation versus Codecision Reports

Studies on the internal organization of the European Parliament (EP) have largely overlooked the impact of its inter-institutional context. Addressing the gap, this paper examines how the different inter-institutional balance of power under the consultation and codecision legislative procedures affects the intra-parliamentary allocation of consultation and codecision reports. The analysis of reports allocated during 2004-2007 shows that the higher competition for codecision reports left unchecked by the informal rules of report allocation has produced clear winners and losers. Disloyal party group members are ‘punished’ by group coordinators in the allocation of any reports. Furthermore, members of the centre-right party group coalition are privileged in the allocation of codecision reports, while legislators with outlying special interests and experts are given systematic access only to drafting consultation reports. Thus, the main mechanisms driving report allocation appear to be promoting party group cohesion and majority formation