We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker. The approach rests on a new probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for an existing protocol security logic, replacing an earlier semantics that uses nondeterministic symbolic evaluation. While the basic form of the protocol logic remains unchanged from previous work, there are some interesting technical problems involving the difference between efficiently recognizing and efficiently producing a value, and involving a reinterpretation of standard logical connectives that seems necessary to support certain forms of reasoning
Security protocols are distributed programs designed to ensure secure communi-cation in a network co...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
Symbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, considering computations that...
We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without ...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
AbstractWe prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocols....
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
. We use properties of observational equivalence for a probabilistic process calculus to prove an au...
We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from prov...
Abstract. We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic p...
Abstract. We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic p...
We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from prov...
Security protocols are distributed programs designed to ensure secure communi-cation in a network co...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
Symbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, considering computations that...
We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without ...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security propert...
AbstractWe prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocols....
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
. We use properties of observational equivalence for a probabilistic process calculus to prove an au...
We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from prov...
Abstract. We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic p...
Abstract. We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic p...
We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from prov...
Security protocols are distributed programs designed to ensure secure communi-cation in a network co...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
Symbolic protocol verification generally abstracts probabilities away, considering computations that...