International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable case is much more difficult; whenever the number of strategies is finite (which is not necessarily the case, even when the state space is finite), the main tool for the exact solving is the construction of the full matrix game and its solving by linear programming. We here propose tools for approximating the value of partially observable games. The lemmas are relatively general, and we apply them for deriving rigorous bounds on the Nash equilibrium of phantom-tic-tac-toe and phantom-Go
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) wi...
This article discusses two contributions to decision-making in complex partially observable stochast...
International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable ...
International audienceWe show some mathematical links between partially observable (PO) games in whi...
We propose an algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of partially observable games usin...
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some me...
In many real-world problems, there is a dynamic interaction between competitive agents. Partially ob...
The value 1 problem is a natural decision problem in algorithmic game theory. For partially observab...
Game theory proved to be very useful in the field of verification of open reactive systems. This is ...
International audienceThis paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly r...
We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) wi...
This study considers the partial monitoring problem with $k$-actions and $d$-outcomes and provides t...
State-of-the-art methods for solving 2-player zero-sum imperfect information games rely on linear pr...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial obser- vation on graphs, in every state of th...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) wi...
This article discusses two contributions to decision-making in complex partially observable stochast...
International audienceSolving games is usual in the fully observable case. The partially observable ...
International audienceWe show some mathematical links between partially observable (PO) games in whi...
We propose an algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of partially observable games usin...
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some me...
In many real-world problems, there is a dynamic interaction between competitive agents. Partially ob...
The value 1 problem is a natural decision problem in algorithmic game theory. For partially observab...
Game theory proved to be very useful in the field of verification of open reactive systems. This is ...
International audienceThis paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly r...
We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) wi...
This study considers the partial monitoring problem with $k$-actions and $d$-outcomes and provides t...
State-of-the-art methods for solving 2-player zero-sum imperfect information games rely on linear pr...
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial obser- vation on graphs, in every state of th...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) wi...
This article discusses two contributions to decision-making in complex partially observable stochast...