International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing results focus on trace properties like secrecy or authentication. There are however several security properties, which cannot be defined (or cannot be naturally defined) as trace properties and require a notion of behavioral equivalence. Typical examples are anonymity, privacy related properties or statements closer to security properties used in cryptography. In this paper, we consider three notions of equivalence defined in the applied pi calculus: observational equivalence, may-testing equivalence, and trace equivalence. First, we study the relationship between these three notions. We show that for determinate processe...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
We consider security properties of cryptographic protocols that can be modeled using the notion of t...
International audienceWe consider security properties of cryptographic protocols that can be modelle...
Abstract. Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence...
Abstract. Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verifi-cation of cryptographic pro...
We consider security properties of cryptographic protocols, that are either trace properties (such a...
International audiencePrivacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typi...
Abstract. Privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typically expres...
International audienceFormal methods have proved effective to automatically analyse protocols. Recen...
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled usingtrace equivalence properties...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
We consider security properties of cryptographic protocols that can be modeled using the notion of t...
International audienceWe consider security properties of cryptographic protocols that can be modelle...
Abstract. Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence...
Abstract. Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verifi-cation of cryptographic pro...
We consider security properties of cryptographic protocols, that are either trace properties (such a...
International audiencePrivacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typi...
Abstract. Privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typically expres...
International audienceFormal methods have proved effective to automatically analyse protocols. Recen...
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled usingtrace equivalence properties...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have...