We do not merely believe or disbelieve propositions; rather we believe or disbelieve them to various degrees of strength. This fact, unassuming as it seems, has been neglected in contemporary philosophical analyses of knowledge and epistemic justification. I argue that no account of knowledge is complete until it takes into account the strength with which one must believe in order to know, and I then show that once we do take it into account it sheds light on the link between knowledge and assertion, on the apparent contextual relativity of judgments about knowledge, and on the conditions under which knowledge is closed under known entailment
This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the ...
textRecent epistemology has been dominated by the knowledge first approach championed by Timothy Wi...
To claim that there is a scientific Concept of knowledge may seem unfounded since it is only an asse...
The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments...
Does knowledge entail belief? This paper argues that the answer depends on how one interprets ‘belie...
According to the common view, as we know, knowledge, in the entire history of western epistemology, ...
Abstract: Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it...
Abstract: Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it...
In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to k...
Hard to say what knowledge is. The more this concept is discussed, the more divergent opinions are. ...
This issue of Discipline filosofiche brings together a number of articles on knowledge and epistemic...
This work is focused on the interconnections between evidence, knowledge, and justification. I defen...
What is knowledge ? How can knowledge be distinguished from simple opinion or belief ? Are we able t...
This thesis is meant to examine whether there is an impossibility of non-empirically known truths. A...
Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (...
This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the ...
textRecent epistemology has been dominated by the knowledge first approach championed by Timothy Wi...
To claim that there is a scientific Concept of knowledge may seem unfounded since it is only an asse...
The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments...
Does knowledge entail belief? This paper argues that the answer depends on how one interprets ‘belie...
According to the common view, as we know, knowledge, in the entire history of western epistemology, ...
Abstract: Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it...
Abstract: Analytic epistemologists agree that, whatever else is true of epistemic justification, it...
In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to k...
Hard to say what knowledge is. The more this concept is discussed, the more divergent opinions are. ...
This issue of Discipline filosofiche brings together a number of articles on knowledge and epistemic...
This work is focused on the interconnections between evidence, knowledge, and justification. I defen...
What is knowledge ? How can knowledge be distinguished from simple opinion or belief ? Are we able t...
This thesis is meant to examine whether there is an impossibility of non-empirically known truths. A...
Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (...
This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the ...
textRecent epistemology has been dominated by the knowledge first approach championed by Timothy Wi...
To claim that there is a scientific Concept of knowledge may seem unfounded since it is only an asse...