From autonomy to authenticity: A radical account of moral praise

Philosophical discourse concerning questions of moral responsibility and praise fall in two general categories. On the one hand, an agent choosing to act in accordance with principles, reasons, or desires that are free from heteronomous influence is both morally responsible and is worthy of moral praise. Theories concerned with moral responsibility in this sense, such as Immanuel Kant and Harry Frankfurt, are theories of autonomy. On the other hand, there are increasing attempts to derive a sense of moral responsibility and praise independent of the question of whether or not an agent is free from heteronomous influence. Despite their differences. I argue that both approaches misunderstand the nature of moral responsibility and moral praise by presupposing a false dichotomy between autonomous and heteronomous influences and by failing to account for a notion of authentic resolve. The upshot is that theories of autonomy are doomed to problems of infinite regress and non-autonomous theories are unable to account for the critical difference between the special character of morally responsible actions and mere causal responsibility. Contra these views I develop a theory of authenticity based upon the early work of Martin Heidegger that resolves the aforementioned problems. Starting from Heidegger\u27s work in the History of the Concept of Time and moving into Being and Time I explain the essential characteristics of selfhood that serve to distinguish authentic from inauthentic existence and ultimately provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to be morally praiseworthy