The morality of physician-assisted suicide and other types of voluntary euthanasia: Dismantling the conceptual framework supporting the status quo

The purpose of the present study is to determine if physician-assisted suicide is ever morally justified and, if so, under what conditions. We begin with a brief introduction of the current debate surrounding the issue of physician-assisted suicide. Chapter One is devoted to establishing the sufficient conditions for an act to constitute suicide. We argue that some acts which are considered to be praiseworthy are in fact acts of suicide. We also argue that some medical practices which are currently considered to be both morally and legally acceptable involve an act of suicide. In order to support our argument, Chapter Two is devoted to establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for euthanasia. The connection between physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia is made insofar as we find that physician-assisted suicide is a type of voluntary euthanasia. Our search for an answer to the moral justification of physician-assisted suicide is now broadened to include all forms of voluntary euthanasia. Chapter Three is directed toward an investigation of the commonly held distinction between active and passive euthanasia. We also examine the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of medical treatment and the distinction between killing and letting die which is supported by the principle of double effect. It is argued that none of the foregoing distinctions merit the moral standing that has been attributed to them. We conclude that there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, either both are morally justified or neither is. In Chapter Four, we consider four major types of arguments against voluntary euthanasia and conclude that none of these arguments show that voluntary euthanasia is morally unjustified. Finally, Chapter Five focuses on two arguments most often found in defense of voluntary euthanasia: the mercy argument and the argument from the right to death. We dismiss the mercy argument as insufficient to support the justification for voluntary euthanasia but find acceptable the argument from a right to death. We conclude that voluntary euthanasia in all its forms is morally justified in those cases in which the agent is convinced that the patient\u27s request is both fixed and rational