Surmounting technological presence: Technology and freedom in the later works of Heidegger and Foucault

Conventional wisdom about technology usually includes at least three basic viewpoints: that technology is instrumental, that it is neutral; and that its development is directed by human beings. The later works of two leading, contemporary philosophers--Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault--present a radical challenge to the conventional wisdom. Both Heidegger and Foucault reject the view that technology is instrumental; they see it as autonomous, forming a horizon that conditions human presuppositions about and engagements in the world. Neither is technology viewed as a neutral invention to be used or abused at will. Instead, Heidegger and Foucault assert that technology marks the culmination of complex lines of historical development over which human beings have no control. Finally, both Heidegger and Foucault hold that humanist principles concerning man\u27s free and rational use of technology are a ruse by which the technological imperative is obscured. The later works of Heidegger and Foucault trace aspects of technology that are overlooked when approached in a conventional manner. Heidegger\u27s ontology makes clear the relationship between technology and modern metaphysical doctrines centering on will. Moreover, it illuminates the manner in which such metaphysical constructs undergird man\u27s delusions about control and total planning. Most importantly it points the way to more fundamental reflection about the essence of technology. Foucault\u27s cratology (i.e., his analysis of power relations) provides a thorough accounting of how modern institutions have become increasingly organized around technologies of discipline, the production of automatically functioning bodies. An interpretation of technology which draws on Heidegger\u27s ontological insights and the cratological discoveries made by Foucault provides a meaningful counterpoint to the conventional notion of technology. Ultimately, checking technological domination requires a form of thinking that ponders the ontological ground from which new historical possibilities arise. At the same time active modes of engagement which disrupt the automatizing of the body must be sought out. The later works of Heidegger and Foucault are fertile ground for discovering modes of engagement in the world which encompass both patient reflection and meaningful action. It is through these solidary modes of engagement that appropriate limits to technology may be discerned