International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic protocols and implementations. They provide automation, modularity and scalability, and have been applied to large protocols. In this tutorial, we illustrate the use of types for verifying authenticity properties, first using a symbolic model of cryptography, then relying on a concrete computational assumption.(1) We introduce refinement types (that is, types carrying formulas to record invariants) for programs written in F# and verified by F7, an SMT-based type checker.(2) We describe a sample authenticated RPC protocol, we implement it in F#, and we specify its security against active adversaries.(3) We develop a sample symbolic library, we ...
Gordon and Jeffrey developed a type system for verification of asymmetric and symmetric cryptographi...
International audienceCryptographic algorithms, protocols, and applications are difficult to impleme...
We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations and verified models of cryptographic pr...
International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic p...
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the s...
International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic p...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the s...
International audienceWe present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying securi...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
We present the first static analysis technique for verifying implementations of cryptographic protoc...
In this technical report we describe an approach for verifying cryptographic protocol implementation...
AbstractIn [19], the authors presented a type-theoretic approach to the verification of security pro...
International audienceWe intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic ...
Increasing attention has recently been given to the formal verification of the source code of crypto...
Gordon and Jeffrey developed a type system for verification of asymmetric and symmetric cryptographi...
International audienceCryptographic algorithms, protocols, and applications are difficult to impleme...
We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations and verified models of cryptographic pr...
International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic p...
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the s...
International audienceType systems are effective tools for verifying the security of cryptographic p...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying security properties of the s...
International audienceWe present the design and implementation of a typechecker for verifying securi...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
We present the first static analysis technique for verifying implementations of cryptographic protoc...
In this technical report we describe an approach for verifying cryptographic protocol implementation...
AbstractIn [19], the authors presented a type-theoretic approach to the verification of security pro...
International audienceWe intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic ...
Increasing attention has recently been given to the formal verification of the source code of crypto...
Gordon and Jeffrey developed a type system for verification of asymmetric and symmetric cryptographi...
International audienceCryptographic algorithms, protocols, and applications are difficult to impleme...
We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations and verified models of cryptographic pr...