Physicalism and Hempel's dilemma

Hempelova dilema sama po sebi nije dovoljna da opovrgne fizikalizam, ali predstavlja dobru polaznu osnovu kojom se može rasvetliti debata između fizikalista i anti-fizikalista, i kojom se fizikalističko stanovište može dovesti u pitanje. Prvi krak Hempelove dileme je potrebno pojačati ukazivanjem na teški problem svesti, i na to da se ne vidi na koji bi način današnja fizika mogla ovaj problem mogla da reši. Drugi krak Hempelove dileme se može potkrepiti primerom Dekartove fizike koji direktno pogađa verziju futurizma koju nudi Džesika Vilson, a takođe čini suviše permisivnom verziju futurizma koju nudi Dženis Dauel. U tom smislu, 'osnažena' Hempelova dilema predstavlja težak problem i za kurentiste i za futuriste, i oni su sada u obavezi da iznađu nove načine da sa njom izađu na kraj.Physicalism is a view according to which the reality in its entirety is physical. Many physicalists think that physics, considered as the fundamental science, can explain the nature of the universe, thus explaining the phenomenal consciousness. Hempel's dilemma is a principal challenge to physicalism that forces physicalists to decide whether they appeal to today's physics or future physics. Both horns of the dilemma are pressing to physicalists, because today's physics is incomplete, and on the other hand, we cannot know whether future completed physics would support physicalists claims, i.e., whether it would be able to explain phenomenal consciousness without postulating non-physical properties into the explanatory basis. Currentists think that today's physics is capable of solving the problem of consciousness, whereas futurists believe that the future physical theory will be able to do it. The author argues that the pressure on physicalists can be increased if we connected explicitly the first horn of the dilemma with the hard problem of consciousness (which is to be distinguished from the explanatory gap problem), and if we used Descartes' physics as a counterexample to futurism