The role of logos in Plato's definition of knowledge

Tema ovog rada jeste Platonovo shvatanje pojma logosa u Teetetu. U prvom delu rada kritikujem semantičke interpretacije logosa u ovom dijalogu iznoseći istovremeno argumente u prilog koherentisičkog razumevanja tog pojma. Zatim nastojim da pokažem da se iz aporetične diskusije u samom dijalogu može izaći ako se izvuku konsekvence iz pobijanja Sokratovog tobožnjeg sna. Naime, Platonov Sokrat pobija shvatanje po kojem se nešto zna samo ako se analizira na sastavne delove, pri čemu o njima nema objašnjenja ali se mogu opaziti. Tako Platon indirektno pokazuje da o elementima složenih struktura postoji znanje, ali koje se ne bazira na čulnom opažanju nego na odgovarajućim logosima, i to tako što se primarni sastojci ne objašnjavaju izolovano već u njihovom međusobnom odnosu, kao i položajem koji zauzimaju u okviru pravilno uređene i struktuirane celine kojoj pripadaju.In this paper the role of the concept of logos in the Theaetetetus has been analyzed. In its first part I criticize the semantic interpretations of the logos. At the same time I give arguments in favor of some kind of coherentist understanding of logos. Then I show that from the aporetic discussion in the dialogue, one can find a way out by means of a consequent interpretation of the so-called dream of Socrates. Herein Plato's Socrates refutes the theory according to which sorely complexes are knowable, whereas the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but only perceivable. In doing this Plato indirectly demonstrates that there is in fact knowledge of elements. And this knowledge is not based on perception, but on the suitable logoi, in such a manner that those primaries are not accountable isolated from each other, but only in their interrelations, and by the position they have in the well ordered and structured whole