The biological basis of morality: egoism, altruism and self-deception

Osnovni cilj ove disertacije je uspostavljanje veze između etike i evolucione biologije. Mada postoji gotovo opšti konsenzus da su biologija i ljudska evoluciona istorija imale nekakvog uticaja na oblikovanje naše moralne sposobnosti, ova veza se obično smatra zagonetnom. Jedan od razloga za to je evoluciona nestabilnost morala. Centralno pitanje koje se u disertaciji postavlja je zašto imamo moralne pojmove, verovanja i sposobnost moralnog rasuđivanja, kao i zašto su naši međusobni odnosi regulisani moralnim pravilima. Vezu između morala i biologije, tj. etike i evolucione teorije, uspostaviću posredno preko moralne psihologije. Preciznije, ova veza će biti ustanovljena preko psihiološkog fenomena samoobmanjivanja. Iako je ovaj fenomen dugo poznat, on je pretežno bio predmet proučavanja psihologije i filozofije duha, a tek nedavno je dobio naučnu artikulaciju u kontekstu evolucione teorije. Za filozofiju verovatno najvažnija posledica ovakvog pristupa je specifična metaetička pozicija koja je poznata kao evolucioni antirealizam. Uprkos činjenici da je većina filozofskih argumenata o evolucionom poreklu morala adaptacionistička, u ovom radu se moralna sposobnost sagledava kao spandrel, odnosno kao nusproizvod prirodne selekcije. Prvo poglavlje ove doktorske disertacije se bavi konceptualnim problemima koji se vezuju za biološku i psihološku interpretaciju egoizma (sebičnosti) i altruizma, a zatim objašnjava vezu između altruizma i morala. Zapravo, u ovom poglavlju se uspostavlja veza između altruizma i moralne sposobnosti koja uključuje moralno ponašanje, formiranje i održavanje moralnih verovanja i moralno suđenje. Osim toga, jedan deo prvog poglavlja posvećen je objašnjenju nekih karakteristika moralnih sudova. Drugo poglavlje se bavi evolucijom altruizma i saradnje, kao i problemom jedinica selekcije. U ovom poglavlju ću kritički preispitati standardne modele za evoluciju altruizma: grupnu selekciju, genski selekcionizam, selekciju u srodničkom krugu (s osvrtom na problem usvajanja i Vestermarkov efekat), direktni reciprocitet (recipročni altruizam), indirektni reciprocitet i selekciju na više nivoa. Na osnovu eksplanatorne kompleksnosti, odbaciću selekciju na više nivoa i za potrebe ovog rada ću se oslanjati uglavnom na teoriju inkluzivne adaptivne vrednosti i direktni reciprocitet. Ovi eksplanatorni modeli će biti dovoljni da se objasni evolucija empatije o kojoj će biti reči u narednom poglavlju. U trećem poglavlju se bavim emocijama i empatijom, koje smatram neposrednim uzrocima psihološkog altruizma i važnim činiocima moralne sposobnosti. Posebna pažnja će biti posvećena Preston/de Valovom integrativnom evolucionom modelu empatije, u čijoj osnovi se nalazi mehanizam zajedničkog kodiranja percepcije i akcije čiji neurobiološki supstrat predstavlja sistem neurona ogledala. Kroz analizu eksperimentalne evidencije i podataka sa terena o altruističkom ponašanju i pomaganju kod dece i šimpanzi, objasniću zašto je empatija značajna za moral. Ipak, iako su primati sposobni da se ponašaju altruistički i verovatno imaju takozvane gradivne blokove morala, njima ipak nedostaje potpuno razvijen fenomen moralnosti. Dakle, moralna sposobnost je specijes specifična karakteristika ljudi...The main objective of this dissertation is to establish link between ethics and evolutionary biology. Although there is almost a general consensus among philosophers that biology and human evolutionary history had some role in shaping our moral capacity (behavior and judgment), this relation is usually considered puzzling. One of the reasons for this is evolutionary instability of morality. The central issue this dissertation raises is why do we have moral concepts, beliefs and moral reasoning ability, and why are interpersonal and social relations maintained by moral rules. I will establish relation between morality and biology, i.e. ethics and evolutionary theory, indirectly via moral psychology. More specifically, this relation is established through psychological phenomenon of self-deception. While this phenomenon has long been known, it was mostly the subject of psychology and philosophy of mind, and just recently got scientific articulation in the context of the evolutionary theory. Probably the most significant philosophical implication of this approach is specific metaethical position known as evolutionary anti-realism. Despite the fact that the most of philosophical arguments on evolutionary origins of morality are adaptationist, in this dissertation moral capacity is considered to be a spandrel, the byproduct of natural selection. The first chapter of this doctoral dissertation deals with conceptual issues of the biological and psychological interpretations of egoism (selfishness) and altruism, and subsequently, it explains relation between altruism and morality. To be more precise, it relates altruism to moral capacity which includes moral behavior, forming and maintaining moral 8 beliefs, and moral judgments. In addition, one part of this chapter I devote to the explanation of some characteristics of moral judgments. The main subjects of the second chapter are the evolution of altruism and cooperation and the related problem of the units of selection. I critically examine the standard models for the evolution of altruism: group selection, gene’s eye view, kin selection (with remarks on adoption and Westermarck effect), direct reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal altruism), indirect reciprocity, and Sober and Wilson’s model of multilevel selection. I will dismiss multilevel selection theory on the grounds of its explanatory complexity and for the purposes of this paper I will mainly rely on inclusive fitness theory and direct reciprocity. Those explanatory models would suffice to explain the evolution of empathy which will be discussed in the next chapter. So, the third chapter is on emotions and empathy which I take to be proximate causes of psychological altruism and important ingredients of moral capacity. Here, special attention is paid to Preston and de Waal’s integrated evolutionary model of empathy, with perception-action mechanism in its core, and mirror neuron system as its neurobiological substrate. Through the analysis of experimental and field data on children’s and chimpanzees altruistic and helping behavior I will explain why empathy is important for morality. Nevertheless, although primates other than humans are capable of acting altruistically and may have so called building blocks of morality, they lack full blown morality. Consequently, moral capacity is a species specific characteristic..