Spinozism and contemporary theories of mind-body relation

Ova disertacija pokušava da odgovori na pitanje da li Spinoza može da nam kaže nešto filozofski interesantno u pogledu odnosa duha i tela. Ona se sastoji iz četiri poglavlja. U prvom poglavlju razmatrao sam različite recepcije i često oprečne ocene Spinozine filozofije. Razmatrao sam osnovne postavke njegovog sistema i bavio sam se danas aktuelnim tumačenjima njegove filozofije. Metod koji sam usvojio je trojak: problemski, istorijski i egzegetski. Problemski pristup sastoji se, pre svega, u ispitivanju plauzibilnosti neke filozofske ideje. Istorijskim pristupom se ta ideja postavlja u specifičan kontekst kojem pripadaju, što bi trebalo da doprinese njenom dubljem razumevanju. Egzegetski metod odnosi se na interpretiranje određenih stavova, i to onako kako su izneseni u Spinozinim spisima, nezavisno i od konteksta kojem pripadaju, i od njihove plauzibilnosti. Drugim rečima, osnovno pitanje problemskog pristupa jeste: Da li je određena ideja prihvatljiva odnosno plauzibilna? Osnovno pitanje istorijskog pristupa je: Kako je određena ideja nastala, šta je uticalo na njeno formiranje i kakve istorijske paralele možemo u njoj pronaći? Napokon, primenjujući egzegetski pristup, pokušavam da odgovori na pitanje: Da li je Spinoza određenu ideju zastupao, odnosno mogao zastupati, i kako bi se ona u okviru njegove filozofije mogla protumačiti? Sledeći ova tri metodska pristupa, u drugom poglavlju sam Spinozinu filozofiju postavio u racionalistički okvir. Potom sam govorio o nekim osnovnim tezama njegove metafizike i epistemologije. U trećem poglavlju, pokušao sam da interpretiram Spinozinu filozofiju ukazujući na neke nedostatke postojećih, realističkih, tumačenja. Pošto sam prethodno skicirao uticaj jevrejskih mislilaca na Spinozu, pokušao sam da pokažem da se njegova filozofija, a posebno filozofija duha, može interpretirati kao antirealistička. U poslednjem poglavlju, bavio sam se odnosom antirealističke filozofije duha (i spinozizma uopšte) i nekih savremenih teorija o odnosu duha i tela. Krajnji zaključak trebalo je da pokaže da spinozistička filozofija duha bar zaslužuje da se ozbiljno razmotri u kontekstu mnogih i dalje otvorenih problema u toj oblasti. Osnovna teza ovog rada, mogla bi se, dakle, sumirati na sledeći način. Prvo, tvrdio sam da ukoliko je razum, na koji se Spinoza poziva definišući atribute, beskonačan, onda nije jasno zašto Spinoza nikada ne govori o više od dva atributa. Naime, supstancija kao beskonačna mora imati beskonačno mnogo atributa. Saznajna ograničenja ljudskih bića manifestuju se u samoj našoj nesposobnosti da prepoznamo više od dva atributa. Ne bi li beskonačni razum morao moći da spozna sve atribute? S obzirom na to da Spinoza o atributima uvek govori iz perspektive ovog ograničenog pogleda na stvari, možemo zaključiti da on veruje u principijelno ograničenje ljudskih saznajnih moći. Drugo, s obzirom na prethodno rečeno, sledi da supstanciju zapravo ne možemo saznati nezavisno od atributa, niti u celovitosti svih njenih karakteristika. Mi i ne znamo šta je ona zaista, niti kako da primenimo dva atributa (mišljenje i protežnost) na nju kakva je po sebi. Ova interpretacija nas vodi do nekoliko uvida. Prvo, Spinozina filozofija ispostavlja se kao plauzibilnija nego što bi se inače moglo činiti. Pre svega, ispostavlja se da mu se, inače neprihvatljive, doktrine panpsihizma i inkrementalizma neopravdano pripisuju. Štaviše, paralelizam govori o tome kako, svako u svom domenu, skup fenomena posmatranih pod atributom mišljenja i skup fenomena posmatranih pod atributom protežnosti imaju sopstveni način funkcionisanja. Ti domeni nisu identični, i zbog toga jednako grešimo kada govorimo o mentalnim stanjima fizikalnim rečnikom, kao što bismo grešili kada bismo o fizičkim stanjima govorili mentalističkim rečnikom. Ispostavlja se da je ovakvo shvatanje Spinozine filozofije posebno plodno u oblasti filozofije duha. Pokušao sam da pokažem da teorije o odnosu duha i tela (posebno one koje su redukcionističke) obično usvajaju isuviše optimistične stavove o budućim naučnim uspesima, kao i relativno sporne pretpostavke o tome šta rezultati naučnih istraživanja govore o prirodi mentalnog. Dalje sam tvrdio da takav problem ne postoji u antirealističkoj teoriji dvostrukog aspekta. Pre svega, ovakva teorija odustaje od pitanjâ: Šta je svest zaista? Kakva je istinska priroda sveta? Umesto toga, unutar nje usvaja se standard eksplanatorne snage – standard na osnovu kojeg težimo da pružimo što plauzibilnije i što potpunije objašnjenje onih fenomena koje ispitujemo, bilo da je reč o mentalnim, bilo da je reč o fizičkim fenomenima. Služeći se shvatanjem nauke koje iznose pesimistički induktivisti, pokušao sam da pokažem da će teorija biti plauzibilna ako, prvo, može uspešno da objasni različite fenomene u svetu i ako, drugo, te fenomene razmatra u svoj njihovoj raznovrsnosti. Razmotrio sam, takođe, i načelni problem koji redukcionisti imaju kada pokušaju da mentalno svedu na fizičko: oni tvrde da nema nikakvog ostatka u oblasti mentalnog. Pa ipak, ako su koristili materijalna sredstva da objasne ono što možda i nije samo materijalno, kako ikada mogu biti sigurni da nema takvog ostatka? Spinozistička filozofija duha se, stoga, može smatrati odgovarajućom alternativa današnjim shvatanjima. Naravno, možda će se zaista ispostaviti da je određena verzija funkcionalizma, redukcionizma ili nekog drugog, danas branjenog, pristupa, zapravo ispravno shvatanje odnosa duha i tela. Ipak, dok se to ne dogodi, nema razloga da u skup teorija koje smatramo prima facie plauzibilnim ne uvrstimo i antirealističku teoriju dvostrukog aspekta.This dissertation attempts to answer the question whether Spinoza has something philosophically interesting to say regarding the mind-body relation. It consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, I dealt with different receptions and often mutually incompatible assessments of Spinoza’s philosophy. I discussed fundamental propositions of Spinoza’s system and dealt with currently prevailing interpretations of his philosophy. The method I adopted is threefold: problematic, historic and exegetic. The problematic approach consists mainly in examining whether certain philosophical idea is plausible or not. Historic approach sets that idea in a specific context to which it belongs, aiming to provide deeper understanding of it. Exegetic approach pertains to the interpretation of certain propositions, understood the way they were stated in Spinoza’s writings, independently both of the context to which they belong, and of their plausibility. In other words, the basic question of the problematic approach was “Is certain idea acceptable or plausible?” The basic question of the historic approach was “How was certain idea formulated, what influenced its formulation, and what historical parallels can we find in it?” Finally, using exegetic approach, I tried to answer the question “Did Spinoza hold, or could have held certain idea and how could we interpret it in the context of his philosophy?” Following these three approaches, in the second chapter I set Spinoza’s philosophy within the rationalist framework. After that, I discussed certain fundamental theses of his metaphysics and epistemology. In the third chapter, I tried to interpret Spinoza’s philosophy by pointing out some problems of existing, realist, interpretations. After that, having previously outlined influence that Jewish thinkers had on Spinoza, I tried to show that his philosophy, especially his philosophy of mind, can be interpreted as antirealist. In the last chapter, I dealt with the relation between antirealist philosophy of mind (and Spinozism in general) and some of the contemporary theories of the mind-body relation. The conclusion was to show that spinozistic philosophy of mind at least deserves to be seriously considered in the context of many problems in philosophy of mind that are still open. The main thesis of the dissertation can, thus, be summed up in the following manner. First, I claimed that if the reason, to which Spinoza refers when defining attributes, is infinite, then it is not clear why Spinoza never talks about more than two attributes. Namely, an infinite substance must have infinite number of attributes. The cognitive limits of human beings are manifested in our very inability to recognize more than the two attributes. Wouldn’t infinite reason have to know all of the attributes? Considering that Spinoza always talks about attributes from this limited perspective, we can conclude that he believes in the principal limits of human cognition. Second, considering what was just said, it follows that substance cannot be known independently of the attributes, nor in the entirety of all of its characteristics. We do not really know what it is, nor how to apply the two attributes (thinking and extension) to the substance as it is in itself. This interpretation leads us to several insights. First, Spinoza’s philosophy turns out to be more plausible than it might initially seem. It turns out that the generally implausible doctrines of panpsychism and incrementalism are incorrectly attributed to him. Furthermore, attribute parallelism pertains to the way the set of phenomena, viewed under the attribute of thought, and the set of phenomena, viewed under the attribute of extension, function within their respective domains. These domains are not identical, and thus we are equally mistaken when we talk about mental states in a physicalist manner, as we would have been if we talked about physical states mentalistically. This interpretation of Spinoza turns out to be especially fruitful in philosophy of mind. I tried to show that theories of the mind-body relation (especially the reductivist ones) usually adopt overly optimistic ideas about the success of future scientific discoveries, as well as relatively dubious assumptions about what scientific results say about the nature of the mental. I further claimed that such a problem does not exist for the antirealist double-aspect theory. First, such a theory gives up on the questions: What consciousness really is? What is the true nature of the world? Instead, within it, we adopt the standard of explanatory power – a standard that we use in our attempt to give as plausible and as comprehensive explanation as possible of the phenomena we examine, whether the phenomena we talk about are mental or physical. Adopting the view of science formulated by pessimistic inductivists, I tried to show that a theory will be plausible if it can, first, successfully explain different phenomena we encounter in the world, and if, second, it considers these phenomena in all their diversity. I have also discussed a general problem reductivists have when they try to reduce the mental to the physical (whether they are identifying the two or eliminating the former): they claim that there is no residuum in the domain of the mental. However, if they used material means to explain what might not be just material, how can they ever be certain that there is no such residuum? Spinozisic philosophy of mind can thus be seen as a proper alternative to the contemporary theories. Of course, it may eventually turn out that a version of functionalism, reductivism, or some other, currently prominent view of the mind-body relation is actually correct. Still, until that happens, there is no reason not to include the antirealist double-aspect theory of mind in the set of theories that we take as prima facie plausible