Coordinating R&D race through patent licensing

This paper explores the extend to which patent licensing can internalize the externalities in patent race models which cause excessive R&D expenditures.In a variation of Lee and Wilde [1980] model with both ex ante and ex post licensing, the following results are obtained: (i) with ex ante licensing agreement, the Nash equilibrium of the R&D race coincides with the cooperative rate of R&D; (ii) ex ante licensing can occur even when it reduces the collective profits of the licenser and the licensee ex post; and (iii) ex post licensing always speeds up innovation relative to the case of no-licensing. 本文对特许经营能内生化在特许权经营模型中带来的R&D超支问题进行了扩展研究。用变异的包含事前和事后的特许经营Lee and Wilde [1980] 模型得到了如下结论：在事前下的专利使用权转让协定，纳什均衡与合作情况下的R&D的比率相符；即使在降低双方的集体利润的情况下事前的特许经营也可以产生；事后特许权经营通常能比在没有特许权经营的情况下加快革新的速度