The Effects of Electoral Systems on Corruption: Why Plurality Rule Produces Less Corruption than Proportional Representation

This paper contributes to the literature analyzing the determinants of corruption by investigating the linkages between a country's corruption level and its electoral system. Specifically, countries with Plurality Rule and Proportional Representation voting systems are compared, seeking to analyze how features of both affect measured rates of corruption. It is concluded that, on balance, Plurality Rule systems tend to outperform Proportional Representation systems at reducing corruption. Drawing from the relevant literature, three reasons for this are suggested: first, electing representatives directly rather than by party list increases a candidate's accountability to voters; second, Plurality Rule systems are structurally associated with fewer political parties leading opposition parties acting as more effective checks and balances against incumbents; and third, Plurality Rule increases incentives for party self-discipline. Despite this, one feature of Proportional Representation systems - namely, the tendency to feature multi-member districts - does contribute to reducing corruption, all else equal. Policy recommendations are investigated following from the conclusions of the study