Cheap Talk and Coordination in the Lab and in the Field: Collective Commercialization in Senegal

Most developing-country farms are small and engage in cooperative agriculture. Prior literature has argued that mechanisms aimed at facilitating smallholder coordination such as cooperatives are central to stimulating market participation. At the same time, cooperatives have not always been able to engage in collective action. In this paper, we conduct neutrally framed coordination games and a natural field experiment to test the effect of cheap talk among members of groundnut-producing cooperatives in Senegal. In both experiments, we ask farmers how much they intend to contribute to the group prior to them actually doing so and then, confidentially reveal aggregate intentions to other cooperative members. Based on survey and administrative data, we find that (1) revealing farmers’ intentions improves collective commercialization and this effect increases with group size and (2) learning in the lab transfers to behavior in the day-to-day environment. Implications for policy and future work are discussed