Controlling Shareholders, Risk-Taking and Firm Value–The Role of Production Market Competition

本研究檢測控制股東持股及其控制權與現金流量權偏離對公司風險承擔的影響，以及產業競爭對該項關係的影響。研究發現，控制股東持股與風險承擔呈現U型非線性關係；表示控制股東持股比率較低時，公司有較高的風險承擔，隨著持股比率增加，控制股東為保全自身利益，會減少公司風險承擔；若控制股東持股超過某一比率，對公司投資決策擁有高度掌控權，為公司提升競爭力及長遠獲利考量，較願意承擔風險以期提升公司價值。產業競爭愈高，公司需投注更多研究發展支出(亦即承擔風險)以維持產品競爭力。控制股東持股及其控制權與現金流量的偏離，皆會削減競爭產業中公司風險承擔的意願。值得一提的是，受到控制股東持股影響的公司風險承擔，對公司未來價值具有正向顯著的影響；受到控制權與現金流量權偏離影響的公司風險承擔，則無法增加公司未來價值。 This study investigates the influence of controlling ownership and the divergence between control rights and cashflow rights on a firm’s risk-taking, and the effect of industry competition on the relationship. The research results show that controlling ownership and firm risk-taking presents a U-shaped relationship. When controlling ownership is relatively low, a firm has high risk-taking. As controlling ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to reduce firm risk-taking to protect their own interests. If controlling shareholdings exceeds a certain ratio, they have high control over a firm's investment decisions. In consideration of firm competitiveness and long-term profitability, they incline to increase firm risk-taking to enhance future firm value. In competitive industry, firms need to invest more research and development (R&D) expenditures (i.e. take more risk) to maintain product competitiveness. Controlling ownership and the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights reduce firm risk-taking in highly competitive industries. It is worth noting that firm risk-taking due to controlling ownership is significantly positively related to future firm value; risk-taking due to control-cash flow rights does not increase firm value.補正完