This is the latest draft of chapter 1 of _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_. It outlines the view that is the focus of the book: Welfarist Pluralism. Welfarist pluralism is the view that all normative reasons for belief are grounded in wellbeing and that being in a positive epistemic state is one of the components of wellbeing. This chapter explains how one can develop a principled version of non-derivative pluralism about normative reasons for belief while still accepting that theoretical reason has a single, unified pragmatic foundation. Updated 10 May 2022
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making so...
The most important questions we ask are normative questions. And the most fundamental normative ques...
This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, i...
This is the latest draft of chapter 1 of _A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations ...
This chapter sets out a theory of how to weigh alethic and pragmatic (non-alethic) reasons for belie...
This paper offers a sketch of welfarist pluralism, a view that is intended to resolve a difficulty f...
This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate...
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivatin...
This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both...
Why do people choose their beliefs? Research on this question has been dominated by a Traditional Mo...
In this thesis I try to develop a partial theory of normativity and justification. In the first part...
My project here is to defend the Unity of Practical Reasons, the view that all practical reasons are...
This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epist...
This paper puts forward a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that brings together two...
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative (i.e., good) epistemic reasons. Af...
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making so...
The most important questions we ask are normative questions. And the most fundamental normative ques...
This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, i...
This is the latest draft of chapter 1 of _A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations ...
This chapter sets out a theory of how to weigh alethic and pragmatic (non-alethic) reasons for belie...
This paper offers a sketch of welfarist pluralism, a view that is intended to resolve a difficulty f...
This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate...
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivatin...
This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both...
Why do people choose their beliefs? Research on this question has been dominated by a Traditional Mo...
In this thesis I try to develop a partial theory of normativity and justification. In the first part...
My project here is to defend the Unity of Practical Reasons, the view that all practical reasons are...
This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epist...
This paper puts forward a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that brings together two...
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative (i.e., good) epistemic reasons. Af...
This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making so...
The most important questions we ask are normative questions. And the most fundamental normative ques...
This is chapter 5 of the book project _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, i...