Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense ...
Easy to access, clear-cut demarcations of memory are the most common modes of\ud approach, for the r...
The imagery we adopt when recalling the personal past may involve different perspectives. In many ca...
Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can only introspect one's own me...
Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to inv...
International audienceConscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, i...
This chapter proposes a radically enactive account of remembering that casts it as creative, dynamic...
I suggest that the theories of remembering one finds in the philosophy of memory literature are best...
This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the phil...
The scope of this paper is my objection to Michaelian’s claim, who advocates that the reliability co...
Memories have content in that they can be correct or incorrect. In addition, memories have an intere...
[Late draft.] The paper examines the roles that may be played by sensory images in relation to the c...
Published: 20 November 2019Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what ...
As the extended mind debate came to maturation, it has conceptualized how cognitive artifa...
We often think of memory in terms of mentally reliving prior events. Such conscious recollection is,...
The phenomenological characteristics of memory are similar to those of imagination: Remembering the ...
Easy to access, clear-cut demarcations of memory are the most common modes of\ud approach, for the r...
The imagery we adopt when recalling the personal past may involve different perspectives. In many ca...
Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can only introspect one's own me...
Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to inv...
International audienceConscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, i...
This chapter proposes a radically enactive account of remembering that casts it as creative, dynamic...
I suggest that the theories of remembering one finds in the philosophy of memory literature are best...
This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the phil...
The scope of this paper is my objection to Michaelian’s claim, who advocates that the reliability co...
Memories have content in that they can be correct or incorrect. In addition, memories have an intere...
[Late draft.] The paper examines the roles that may be played by sensory images in relation to the c...
Published: 20 November 2019Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what ...
As the extended mind debate came to maturation, it has conceptualized how cognitive artifa...
We often think of memory in terms of mentally reliving prior events. Such conscious recollection is,...
The phenomenological characteristics of memory are similar to those of imagination: Remembering the ...
Easy to access, clear-cut demarcations of memory are the most common modes of\ud approach, for the r...
The imagery we adopt when recalling the personal past may involve different perspectives. In many ca...
Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can only introspect one's own me...