Real-world communication protocols are often built out of a number of simpler protocols that cater for some specific functionality (e.g., banking, authentication). However much of the formal definitions of protocols used for program verification treat protocols as monolithic units. Composition is considered for implementations of a protocol, but not for the protocols themselves as engineering components. We propose primitives and techniques for the modular composition of protocols. Our notion of composition defines an interleaving of two or more protocols in a way that satisfies user-specified context-dependent constraints which serve to explain “contact points” between the protocols. The resulting approach gives a theoretical basis for pro...
Formal analysis is widely used to prove security properties of the protocols. There are tools to che...
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to illustrate a compositional proof method for communicating sy...
Protocols do not work alone, but together, one protocol relying on another to provide needed service...
In programming, protocols are everywhere. Protocols describe the pattern of interaction (or communic...
The aim of this research is to present a new methodology for the systematic de sign of compound prot...
An interaction protocol specifies the constraints on communication between agents in a multiagent sy...
The service specification ss(P ) of a protocol P defines the services provided by the protocol and i...
Introduction There has been considerable research on formal analysis of security protocols, ranging...
AbstractThe application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researc...
Establishing the correctness of reliable distributed protocols supporting dependable applications ne...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger pr...
The problem of designing a correct real-time protocol is a challenging task and has led researchers ...
AbstractThis paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security ...
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched duri...
Formal analysis is widely used to prove security properties of the protocols. There are tools to che...
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to illustrate a compositional proof method for communicating sy...
Protocols do not work alone, but together, one protocol relying on another to provide needed service...
In programming, protocols are everywhere. Protocols describe the pattern of interaction (or communic...
The aim of this research is to present a new methodology for the systematic de sign of compound prot...
An interaction protocol specifies the constraints on communication between agents in a multiagent sy...
The service specification ss(P ) of a protocol P defines the services provided by the protocol and i...
Introduction There has been considerable research on formal analysis of security protocols, ranging...
AbstractThe application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researc...
Establishing the correctness of reliable distributed protocols supporting dependable applications ne...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger pr...
The problem of designing a correct real-time protocol is a challenging task and has led researchers ...
AbstractThis paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security ...
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched duri...
Formal analysis is widely used to prove security properties of the protocols. There are tools to che...
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to illustrate a compositional proof method for communicating sy...
Protocols do not work alone, but together, one protocol relying on another to provide needed service...