Hallucination and naive realism

A perennial challenge for naive realism is the argument from hallucination which relies on some version of the claim that veridical perception and hallucination share some deep similarity. Naive realists account for the character of veridical experience in terms of certain special relations to parts of the external world. But some hallucinations seem to share the same character despite those relations being absent. In recent literature, Michael Martin has sharpened this worry about hallucination by presenting the so-called ‘screening off problem’. The idea is that the causal factors that explain the character of experience in the case of hallucination are also present in the case of veridical perception, and that such factors should be adequate to explaining the character of experience in both cases (since things look the same to a subject as between a case of veridical perception and its hallucinatory counterpart). Since, according to the argument, such factors do not involve the naive realist’s special relations to the external world, such relations are explanatorily screened off. In this dissertation, I carefully examine the range of naive realist theories on the market and attempt to extract some core theses and thereby unify presentations that differ in terminology. As important ground clearing, I articulate along the way the various relevant kinds of perceptual experience and the crucial ideology of phenomenal character. Next, I examine what is often regarded as the most powerful case for naive realism, namely its intuitive appeal and argue that the supposed intuitive advantages of naive realism over its main competitor, intentionalism, are overstated. In evaluating the screening off problem, I argue, its standard presentation is quite problematic. I go on to present a new variant of the screening off problem, one based on narrowness rather than causation, that is crisper and more challenging than the original version. I present a menu of escape routes for the naive realist. The good news for the naive realist is that there are quite a few possible escape routes. The bad news is that they are all unappetizing. Finally, I turn to William Fish’s naive realism, which constitutes the most prominent recent defense of that approach. Two novel arguments are presented against Fish’s account of hallucination. One of those arguments, which receives extended attention, turns on the HP principle: that hallucinability entails possibility. First, I show that Fish’s view is committed to the HP principle. Next, I work through several different potential counterexamples and use them as case studies to test the HP principle. I ultimately argue against the HP principle and thereby demonstrate the failure of Fish’s positive account of hallucination. I also argue that Fish imposes indefensible connections between the character of experience and rational agents.Ph.D.Includes bibliographical reference