It’s all about choice : the right not to use the internet

Time and again, a debate pops up on whether access to the internet should be made a human right. While some have favoured universal access thereto with as little restrictions as possible (for instance, La Rue or the UN Human Rights Council), others have argued against, as – for instance – technology was only an ‘enabler of rights’ (Cerf). Ten years ago, Paul De Hert and I could not but partake in this debate: in our 2012 article we saw more benefits than disadvantages of protecting internet access at the highest legal level.Back then, this debate concerned an option to access the internet. Over the past years, however, while the use of the internet – and, more broadly, the use of (new) technologies – has accelerated, it increasingly ceased to be a mere option, a choice, a (legal) entitlement or a (human) right. Rather, it has turned into a (de facto) obligation for anyone who exercises their rights or fulfils their duties. These days, for instance, various services have become available predominantly – and sometimes only – via the internet (for instance, banking services, passenger location forms or applications for social assistance, as depicted in I, Daniel Blake). Overall, life without (a ‘smart’ phone) internet access has become unduly burdensome and – at times – impossible.These developments beg many questions and some of them include whether and to what extent people could be (or: should be) forced to use the internet, or whether such an obligation conforms to democratic standards. These questions can be considered from many angles such as ethics (is it good?) or law (is it legal?), and, therein, human rights (does it interfere with these rights? is this interference proportionate?). Hence, in this blogpost, I look at whether the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, European Convention) and the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) can protect individuals against such an obligation