Practical conflict, realism and character

Although no one denies that persons experience practical conflict, many philosophers deny the existence of genuine moral conflict. This dissertation argues that a proper understanding of practical conflict places a heavy burden on anyone wishing to deny the existence of genuine moral dilemmas. The structure of the argument is essentially transcendental. Specifically, after detailing a realist conception of situations of practical conflict, I consider the plight of Captain Vere in Melville\u27s Billy Budd, Sailor. Using this character, and some hypothetical variants, I argue that only by accepting a restricted realist conception of practical conflict can we adequately explain and understand the evaluative judgments that we ordinarily and naturally make about agents and their circumstances. In particular, accepting a realist conception of practical conflict is necessary for adequately capturing and explaining our understanding of an agent\u27s character, deliberations, and emotions. Furthermore, since the realism I advocate entails a realist view about reasons for action, I conclude that a realist view of reasons for action must be true. The concluding chapter argues that acceptance of a realist conception of practical conflict places upon opponents of genuine practical conflict and moral dilemmas an extraordinary burden: Opponents of genuine conflict must argue that rational solutions to experiences of practical conflict always exist, and that agents not finding such solutions are ignorant or mistaken. I claim that sometimes neither characterization is correct. Specifically, I argue that those explanations incorrectly interpret experiencing conflict as merely idiosyncratic and symptomatic of an ill-prepared practical agent or undeveloped character. Furthermore, I suggest that those explanations are inconsistent with the realism upon which our evaluative judgments rest and to which we are necessarily committed. Hence, I conclude that only at the expense of distorting our experience of the moral world and making it unintelligible, can one oppose the existence of genuine conflict