Managing performance in global megaprojects: the case of the TEN-T policy

Riding the wave of NPM reforms, since the 1970s Performance Management Systems (PMSs) have spread in many countries, across various policy areas and at every level of government. The rationale behind these tools lies in the belief that the public sector works better if public administrative bodies are oriented toward results, rather than being focused on processes. Some studies have showed that PMSs’ functioning conflict with important-but-unmeasured democratic values. In a similar vein, academic scholars have noticed that their implementation may result into disciplinary regimes producing organizational forces that structure and guide managers’ decisions to allocate penalties across the organization field. This article addresses the functioning of PMSs in the complex settings of the EU’s trans-European transport network policy. It draws on the Foucauldian theory of power to explain how PMSs enable EU-level officers to govern complex trans-national organizational processes – involving many different stakeholders such as governments, local communities, independent administrative bodies, lobbies and industry – by representing them in a form amenable to managerial and political decision