Dynamic traffic equilibria with route and departure time choice

This thesis studies the dynamic equilibrium behavior in traffic networks and it is motivated by rush-hour congestion. It is well understood that one of the key causes of traffic congestion relies on the behavior of road users. These do not coordinate their actions in order to avoid the creation of traffic jams, but rather make choices that favor only themselves and not the community. An equilibrium occurs when everyone is satisfied with his own choices and would not benefit from changing them. We focus on dynamic mathematical models where the congestion delay of a road varies over time, depending on the amount of traffic that has crossed it up to that specific moment and independently on the pattern of traffic that will cross it at a later time. We mainly consider settings with arbitrary network topologies where users choose both the route and departure time and we tackle questions such as the followings: - Does an equilibrium always exist? - Can there be different equilibria? - How can an equilibrium behavior be computed? - How can one set tolls on roads so that, in an equilibrium, there is no congestion and social welfare is maximized