We study the maximum information gain that an adversary may obtain through hacking without being detected. Consider a dynamical process observed by a sensor that transmits a local estimate of the system state to a remote estimator according to some reference transmission policy across a packet-dropping wireless channel equipped with acknowledgments (ACK). An adversary overhears the transmissions and proactively hijacks the sensor to reprogram its transmission policy. We define perfect secrecy as keeping the averaged expected error covariance bounded at the legitimate estimator and unbounded at the adversary. By analyzing the stationary distribution of the expected error covariance, we show that perfect secrecy can be attained for unstable s...
This thesis examines the challenges of information-theoretic secret communication that exploits the ...
We assume that the states of an unstable dynamical system are encoded and sent to an estimator throu...
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender’s mixed s...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of an eavesdropper. A sensor transmi...
In this chapter, we study a remote state estimation problem in the presence of an eavesdropper. A se...
We consider remote state estimation in the presence of an active eavesdropper. A sensor forward loca...
The problem of remote state estimation in the presence of eavesdroppers has recently been investiga...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of eavesdroppers have recently been investigated in...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. An author...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of an eavesdropper have recently been studied. In ...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of eavesdroppers have recently been investigated in...
Secure transmission of information over wireless channels in the presence of an eavesdropper has att...
In this article, a new relay-aided secure communication system is investigated, where a transmitter ...
The secure transmission of information over wireless systems in the presence of an eavesdropper has ...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, under the...
This thesis examines the challenges of information-theoretic secret communication that exploits the ...
We assume that the states of an unstable dynamical system are encoded and sent to an estimator throu...
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender’s mixed s...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of an eavesdropper. A sensor transmi...
In this chapter, we study a remote state estimation problem in the presence of an eavesdropper. A se...
We consider remote state estimation in the presence of an active eavesdropper. A sensor forward loca...
The problem of remote state estimation in the presence of eavesdroppers has recently been investiga...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of eavesdroppers have recently been investigated in...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. An author...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of an eavesdropper have recently been studied. In ...
Remote state estimation problems in the presence of eavesdroppers have recently been investigated in...
Secure transmission of information over wireless channels in the presence of an eavesdropper has att...
In this article, a new relay-aided secure communication system is investigated, where a transmitter ...
The secure transmission of information over wireless systems in the presence of an eavesdropper has ...
We study the problem of remote state estimation in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, under the...
This thesis examines the challenges of information-theoretic secret communication that exploits the ...
We assume that the states of an unstable dynamical system are encoded and sent to an estimator throu...
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender’s mixed s...