sorry for the silly error. hopefully this'll do the trick. --rickTraditional theories of cognition assume that motor action is executed in an all-or-none fashion, and has little importance for understanding cognitive representation and processing. A series of experiments and simulations presented here challenges this assumption. A relatively higher-order cognitive process, categorization, is shown to have graded effects that are reflected in manual motor output, measured through streaming x-y coordinates from mouse trajectories. Two simulations show that these effects are likely generated from a system in which cognition and action interact fluidly. Finally, theoretical implications of these experiments are drawn out. Symbolic dynamics is i...
In this thesis, I shall explore the theoretical and empirical expositions regarding the causal mecha...
We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is im...
Schack T, Ritter H. Representation and learning in motor action – bridges between experimental resea...
We organisms are sensorimotor systems. The things in the world come in contact with our sensory surf...
SummaryActs of cognition can be described at different levels of analysis: what behavior should char...
Cognitive science is a form of "reverse engineering" (as Dennett has dubbed it). We are trying to ex...
We dispute Carey's assumption that distinct core cognitive processes employ domain-specific input an...
Classical cognitivist and connectionist models posit a Cartesian disembodiment of mind assuming that...
The future progress of cognitive science looks set to involve ever-increasing efforts to anchor rese...
The paper is dedicated to particular cases of interaction and mutual impact of philosophy and cognit...
Cognition, historically considered uniquely human capacity, has been recently found to be the abilit...
In the past decade neuroscientists have arrived at an understanding of neural representation that po...
embodied cognition, dynamical systems, neural network models, sensory-motor systems The symbol groun...
In this article, we highlight three questions: (1) Does human cognition rely on structured internal ...
How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and co...
In this thesis, I shall explore the theoretical and empirical expositions regarding the causal mecha...
We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is im...
Schack T, Ritter H. Representation and learning in motor action – bridges between experimental resea...
We organisms are sensorimotor systems. The things in the world come in contact with our sensory surf...
SummaryActs of cognition can be described at different levels of analysis: what behavior should char...
Cognitive science is a form of "reverse engineering" (as Dennett has dubbed it). We are trying to ex...
We dispute Carey's assumption that distinct core cognitive processes employ domain-specific input an...
Classical cognitivist and connectionist models posit a Cartesian disembodiment of mind assuming that...
The future progress of cognitive science looks set to involve ever-increasing efforts to anchor rese...
The paper is dedicated to particular cases of interaction and mutual impact of philosophy and cognit...
Cognition, historically considered uniquely human capacity, has been recently found to be the abilit...
In the past decade neuroscientists have arrived at an understanding of neural representation that po...
embodied cognition, dynamical systems, neural network models, sensory-motor systems The symbol groun...
In this article, we highlight three questions: (1) Does human cognition rely on structured internal ...
How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and co...
In this thesis, I shall explore the theoretical and empirical expositions regarding the causal mecha...
We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is im...
Schack T, Ritter H. Representation and learning in motor action – bridges between experimental resea...