PENERAPAN COVERAGE LIMIT SISTEM PENJAMINAN SIMPANAN PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH DI INDONESIA

The development of the latest financial perspective reveals aspects of the stability of the financial system is important to put forward. The application of a Deposit Insurance System in many countries is an effort to achieve this stability. Risks that are always inherent in the financial and banking sectors, can occur in times of crisis and result in a collapse of the country's economy. To overcome the effects of the crisis, the government must spend a significant amount of money and issue policies that are not easy. This study tries to look at the application of the Deposit Insurance System in Indonesia through the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation which was established in 2005 based on Law Number 24 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation. So far, many studies have tried to analyze the Deposit Insurance System in conventional banks, but few have seen the impact on Islamic banking. More specifically, this study discusses the ability of the Deposit Insurance Agency in the potential moral risks associated with channeling bank financing. Moral hazard risk will not be eliminated, but can be reduced. One parameter that is very influential in maintaining the level of moral hazard risk is to remain low and be within the tolerance limit of the maximum value of guaranteed deposits (coverage limit). This thesis also attempts to examine other influential parameters by including macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, inflation rates, interest rates guaranteed by LPS, and the development of distribution of funding funds in Islamic banking. This study proves that the implementation of DIS by LPS in Islamic banking in Indonesia through the imposition of coverage limits has not been proven to drive the moral hazard level of Islamic banking financing in Indonesia. Modeling is done using quarterly data from March 2007 to September 2019 and produces a coefficient of determination of 95%, which means that the model is statistically quite good in explaining variations in moral hazard changes in Islamic banking financing to the independent variables. It is expected that the Deposit Insurance Corporation will sharpen the analysis of the amount of deposits guaranteed effectively in order to reduce the risk of moral hazard both in general and in connection with the distribution of financing of guarantee bank