Add to ORKGWe examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bargaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also obtained. Relevant applications include assembly of patents for drug treatments from the human genome, and land assembly
This article explores possible mechanisms for ensuring that the innovation goal of the patent system...
Working Paper GAEL ; 2009-07International audienceThe authors develop a theoretical model where two ...
Gaining access to technological assets and patents, in particular, has long been a major motive and ...
We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two differ...
High technology companies commit time, effort, and resources to innovation. Over the course of a res...
Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when techno...
Profiting from innovation typically involves a choice between commercializing a patented technology ...
Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms’ R&D incentives...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
We consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside inn...
In many industrial sectors, firms amass large patent portfolios to reinforce their bargaining positi...
In a patent portfolio race, firms attempt to assemble a large collection of patents. Traditional exp...
Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms’ pate...
We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside ...
This article explores possible mechanisms for ensuring that the innovation goal of the patent system...
Working Paper GAEL ; 2009-07International audienceThe authors develop a theoretical model where two ...
Gaining access to technological assets and patents, in particular, has long been a major motive and ...
We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two differ...
High technology companies commit time, effort, and resources to innovation. Over the course of a res...
Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when techno...
Profiting from innovation typically involves a choice between commercializing a patented technology ...
Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms’ R&D incentives...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
We consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside inn...
In many industrial sectors, firms amass large patent portfolios to reinforce their bargaining positi...
In a patent portfolio race, firms attempt to assemble a large collection of patents. Traditional exp...
Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms’ pate...
We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside ...
This article explores possible mechanisms for ensuring that the innovation goal of the patent system...
Working Paper GAEL ; 2009-07International audienceThe authors develop a theoretical model where two ...
Gaining access to technological assets and patents, in particular, has long been a major motive and ...