Two-sector optimal growth with illegal migrants.

Moy Hon-man.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (leaf 62).Abstracts in English and Chinese.Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Literature Review --- p.1Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review --- p.4Chapter 2 --- Non-optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.9Chapter 2.1 --- One-sector Non-optimizing Model --- p.9Chapter 2.1.1 --- Illegal Migrants --- p.9Chapter 2.1.2 --- Production --- p.10Chapter 2.1.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.11Chapter 2.2 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in Consump- tion Sector --- p.12Chapter 2.2.1 --- Production --- p.13Chapter 2.2.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.14Chapter 2.2.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.15Chapter 2.3 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in Invest- ment Sector --- p.17Chapter 2.3.1 --- Production --- p.17Chapter 2.3.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.18Chapter 2.3.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.18Chapter 2.4 --- Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants in both Sectors --- p.20Chapter 2.4.1 --- Production --- p.20Chapter 2.4.2 --- Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital --- p.21Chapter 2.4.3 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.22Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing the Two-sector Non-optimizing Models --- p.24Chapter 2.6 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Non-optimizing Models --- p.25Chapter 3 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.28Chapter 3.1 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage --- p.28Chapter 3.1.1 --- Production --- p.28Chapter 3.1.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.29Chapter 3.2 --- One-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: The Hazari Sgro Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.32Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Basic Structure --- p.32Chapter 3.2.2 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.34Chapter 3.2.3 --- Parameterizing the Model --- p.36Chapter 4 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants --- p.38Chapter 4.1 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector --- p.38Chapter 4.1.1 --- Production --- p.38Chapter 4.1.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.39Chapter 4.2 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Mi- grants in Investment Sector --- p.42Chapter 4.2.1 --- Production --- p.42Chapter 4.2.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.43Chapter 4.3 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: Illegal Mi- grants in both Sectors --- p.45Chapter 4.3.1 --- Production --- p.46Chapter 4.3.2 --- The Maximization Problem --- p.46Chapter 4.4 --- Analytical Insights --- p.49Chapter 4.5 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector --- p.50Chapter 4.6 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in Investment Sector --- p.52Chapter 4.7 --- Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: Illegal Migrants in both Sectors --- p.53Chapter 4.8 --- Parameterizing the Models --- p.55Chapter 4.9 --- Simulation Results --- p.55Chapter 4.9.1 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage --- p.55Chapter 4.9.2 --- Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage --- p.57Chapter 5 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.60Figures and Tables --- p.6