Disambiguating Kantian non-conceptual representation

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a disambiguation of the role that non-conceptual\ud representation and content plays in Kant???s Critique of Pure Reason. This project of disambiguation is undertaken in three parts: the first of which is dedicated to establishing that the textual evidence shows that Kant does appear to allow for non-conceptual representation, namely pre-synthesized intuition and the manifold representations therein. In the second section, arguments are given against the position advanced by Lucy Allais who argues that non-conceptual intuition should be regarded as non-conceptual perception with intentional content. Finally, this thesis concludes with a positive exegetical argument that all Kantian non-conceptual representations are explanatory posits which are not discrete events that are separately identifiable from fully formed cognition. That is, Kant???s explanandum in the first Critique is cognition, and all claims about the process of sensibility and the understanding of intuition serve to clarify the results of Kant???s transcendental analysis of human cognition, and are not an attempt to offer an account of mental processes arrived at by way of investigation into the faculties of the mind