Can Norton's material theory of induction escape from Hume's skepticism

Hume's 'problem of induction' has made justifying and validating inferences from\ud empirical observation near impossible for many years. Because the problem\ud states that there is no universal rule that can validate observations of things\ud being some way to the inference that things will continue to be that way, John D.\ud Norton propose a theory of induction based, not on universal rules of inference,\ud but rather on material facts. While I believe that Norton's theory does help\ud empirical science escape from an almost fallacious reliance on a formal theory of\ud induction, the necessary theories that give background justification to inferences\ud made from our observations is ultimately normative and not empirical. If this is\ud the case, then it seems that Norton has not come out of the shadow of Hume's\ud skepticism