The place of health in the liberal theory of justice

The objective of this article is to provide a reasonable account of the political significance\ud of health within the liberal theory of justice as elaborated by John Rawls. First, I argue\ud against the biomedical approach of defining health when the notion is embraced as a\ud political value and ideal. An interpretation of health that is politically useful in deriving\ud ethical claims of rights and responsibilities requires a normative component. In this\ud paper, I appeal to the liberal framework of justice to shape the political conception of\ud health. Second, I consider two prominent liberal interpretations of health and argue that\ud they are, in some ways, inadequate. Third, I make the case that the most reasonable\ud political conception of health is derived from Rawls???s democratic conception of persons.\ud By understanding the public or institutional identity of citizens as persons who possess\ud two moral powers and the two highest order moral interests to develop and exercise these\ud powers, we can then derive the political significance of health as a necessary background\ud condition to enable these powers. Therefore, structural arrangements and institutional\ud practices should promote public health to the extent that the highest order moral interests\ud shaped by all citizens are developed and sustained