The existential demand of virtue : a response to moral situationism

In Lack o f Character, John Doris argues that virtue ethics has been\ud debunked by social psychological studies, which he argues indicate a lack\ud of character traits in individuals. Doris argues that situational variance,\ud rather than character traits, is explanatory of human behavior. In this paper\ud I argue that Doris mischaracterizes the central features of virtue ethics as\ud understood by ancient philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and\ud the Stoics. I propose a solution to the problem of situationism based on an\ud argument that ancient virtue ethics may be understood as both rare and\ud egalitarian. Ideal moral action is characterized by the virtuous individual\ud who instantiates a moral lifestyle, while practical ethical norms are\ud derivative of this ideal. Thus, activities such as the virtuous person would\ud perform are morally praiseworthy even if not attended by the proper moral\ud attitude