Fineness of grain and the myth of the given

There is debate in contemporary cognitive semantics about whether perceptual content\ud includes nonconceptual content. One argument that purports to conclude that\ud there is nonconceptual content is the fineness of grain argument. Conceptualists, on\ud the other hand, argue that positing nonconceptual content is an appeal to what Wilfrid\ud Sellars dubbed the Myth of the Given. Although this Myth is largely taken to\ud be an epistemological problem, I argue that there is a semantic component to Sellars???\ud Myth and that this component posses a threat to the success of the fineness of\ud grain argument. In addition I argue that Kantian sensations, understood to play a\ud dual role as both causal antecedents to conceptual representations and constituents\ud in conceptual representations, can solve the semantic problems raised by the fineness\ud of grain argument