An analysis of the rate for controlling, monitoring and supervision of exploration and mining activities of mineral resources (TFRM).

Submitted by Ana Caroline Calderaro (karolcalderaro@hotmail.com) on 2016-08-02T14:00:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 ARTIGO_AnalysisRateControlling.pdf: 153725 bytes, checksum: ea190eca4035f565d09363e4a7f13ade (MD5)Approved for entry into archive by Oliveira Flávia (flavia@sisbin.ufop.br) on 2016-08-02T14:13:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 ARTIGO_AnalysisRateControlling.pdf: 153725 bytes, checksum: ea190eca4035f565d09363e4a7f13ade (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-08T14:41:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ARTIGO_AnalysisRateControlling.pdf: 153725 bytes, checksum: ea190eca4035f565d09363e4a7f13ade (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016Recently, the Brazilian media reported the withdrawal of the rate on profit from mining of coal and iron ore by the government of Australia. In Australia this rate was created in 2012 to finance social programs. However, due to the drop in the value of mineral commodities, the government has reversed this trend and seeks to quash the law that created such a rate, while keeping its social program financial support. One can observe the opposite in Brazil, where the states of Minas Gerais, Pará, Amapá and Mato Grosso do Sul, created the Rate for Controlling, Monitoring and Supervision of Exploration and Mining Activities of Mineral Resources (TFRM). These states’ rates have been grounds for numerous political, economic, administrative and legal discus¬sions. This paper presents an analysis of state laws that created the TFRM, examines the ways taken by mining companies to question the constitutionality of these laws and concludes that the levy of TFRM breaks the principle of equality, penalizes min¬ing, violates the precept contained in article 152 the Federal Constitution of 1988 and helps reduce the competitiveness of Brazilian mining.