Add to ORKGWith a credence good, consumers are never sure about the extent of the good that they actually need. Experts such as doctors and lawyers, as well as auto mechanics and appliance service-persons (the sellers) not only provide the services, but also act as the expert in determining the customer's requirements. This information asymmetry between buyers and the seller creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat. We analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non-fraudulent seller behavior
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor afte...
Many important markets, such as those for health care or repair services, are characterized by prono...
This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the production standards. ...
With a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need. Therefore, th...
With a credence good consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. There...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of th...
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
Credence Goods, or goods whose quality cannot be fully evaluated by the consumer, play a significant...
We consider a market for credence goods. There are two types of experts: persons who never cheat and...
A client has a problem, but does not know whether it is serious or minor. She consults an expert who...
Credence-goods experiments have focused on stylized settings in which experts can perfectly identify...
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase - ex ante - nor af...
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor afte...
Many important markets, such as those for health care or repair services, are characterized by prono...
This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the production standards. ...
With a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need. Therefore, th...
With a credence good consumers are never sure about the extent of the good they actually need. There...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers tha...
Abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of th...
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatmen...
Credence Goods, or goods whose quality cannot be fully evaluated by the consumer, play a significant...
We consider a market for credence goods. There are two types of experts: persons who never cheat and...
A client has a problem, but does not know whether it is serious or minor. She consults an expert who...
Credence-goods experiments have focused on stylized settings in which experts can perfectly identify...
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase - ex ante - nor af...
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor afte...
Many important markets, such as those for health care or repair services, are characterized by prono...
This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the production standards. ...