Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of Ready-to-Eat Cereal

Traditional merger analysis, based on market definition and use of concentration measures to infer potential anti-competitive effects, is problematic and difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products. This paper discusses an alternative which consists of a front-end estimation of demand and back-end use of a model of post-merger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger. I discuss and demonstrate the use of different methods of estimating demand. Furthermore, I show how the estimated demand parameters can be used to compute the post-merger price equilibrium (rather than just an approximation to it) and changes in welfare. The methodology is applied to two recent mergers and two hypothetical mergers in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. The results clearly demonstrate the importance of the model used in front-end estimation and the computation of equilibrium in determining the competitive effects of a merger