Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Merger Guidelines to articulate in greater detail how they would treat claims of efficiencies associated with horizontal mergers: claims that are frequently made, as for instance in the recently proposed merger between Heinz and Beech-Nut in the market for baby food. While these revisions to the Guidelines have a solid economic basis, they leave open many questions, both in theory and in practice. In this essay, we evaluate some aspects of the treatment of efficiencies, based on three years of enforcement experience under the revised Guidelines, including several litigated mergers, and based on economic principles drawn from oligopoly theory r...
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for a...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly wi...
We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly w...
This thesis discusses the welfare effects of horizontal mergers and firms' incentives to merge. More...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have embarked on an effort to ...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for a...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
Three years ago, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission revised their Horizontal Me...
We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly wi...
We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly w...
This thesis discusses the welfare effects of horizontal mergers and firms' incentives to merge. More...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have embarked on an effort to ...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
When should the government challenge a merger that might increase market power but also generate eff...
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for a...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...
An unsettled question in U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal mergers involving market power sho...