Blainey (1988) popularized the argument that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative bargaining power. This is known as the 'mutual optimism' cause of war. Fey and Ramsay (2007) claim that this explanation is not logically coherent. They prove for a general class of models that war cannot occur with positive probability in equilibrium because of mutual optimism. We show that their environment relies on two assumptions that are substantively implausible. If we relax either assumption, war occurs with positive probability in equilibrium when there is sufficient optimism. We also argue that any substantively compelling model of crisis bargaining, by definition, cannot belong to the class studied by F...
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one player ...
The main theoretical task facing students of war is not to add to the already long list of arguments...
Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incom-plete information, an initial ...
Abstract. Blainey (1988) popularized the argument that crises are more likely to end in war when two...
argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative powe...
Blainey (1988) argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about thei...
One of the most widely accepted explanations for why wars occur despite ist Pareto-suboptimality is ...
W hy do states fight costly wars when less costly negotiated settlements are possible? Must there no...
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of t...
A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding div...
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Mar...
A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding div...
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power...
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at SpringerLink.com Abstract We pro...
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power...
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one player ...
The main theoretical task facing students of war is not to add to the already long list of arguments...
Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incom-plete information, an initial ...
Abstract. Blainey (1988) popularized the argument that crises are more likely to end in war when two...
argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative powe...
Blainey (1988) argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about thei...
One of the most widely accepted explanations for why wars occur despite ist Pareto-suboptimality is ...
W hy do states fight costly wars when less costly negotiated settlements are possible? Must there no...
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of t...
A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding div...
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Mar...
A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding div...
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power...
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at SpringerLink.com Abstract We pro...
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power...
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one player ...
The main theoretical task facing students of war is not to add to the already long list of arguments...
Many game-theoretic models of crisis bargaining find that under incom-plete information, an initial ...