Add to ORKGTwo notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and im-perfect inform...
Consider the following “informational robustness” question: what can we say about the set of outcome...
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for c...
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying pr...
Abstract We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric inf...
Abstract A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, st...
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way ...
A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete in...
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information....
Abstract We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that di¤er in ...
We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets suc...
International audienceThis paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expect...
We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information ...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
This dissertation introduces bounded rationality on matching markets,by way of imperfect cognition i...
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and im-perfect inform...
Consider the following “informational robustness” question: what can we say about the set of outcome...
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for c...
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying pr...
Abstract We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric inf...
Abstract A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, st...
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way ...
A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete in...
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information....
Abstract We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that di¤er in ...
We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets suc...
International audienceThis paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expect...
We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information ...
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characteriz...
This dissertation introduces bounded rationality on matching markets,by way of imperfect cognition i...
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and im-perfect inform...
Consider the following “informational robustness” question: what can we say about the set of outcome...
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for c...