Add to ORKGI hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will. © 2006 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or...
This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of be...
I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the...
It has seemed to many philosophers - perhaps to most - that believing is not voluntary, that we cann...
In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship ...
This paper argues that a popular account of intentions can be extended to beliefs. Beliefs are stabl...
I argue that one should not confuse two issues about the relationship between belief and the will: t...
I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible an...
One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that th...
Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and jus...
The author argues that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense p...
Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t ...
I defend the view that we act “under the guise of the good.” More specifically, I argue that an inte...
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or...
This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of be...
I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the...
It has seemed to many philosophers - perhaps to most - that believing is not voluntary, that we cann...
In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship ...
This paper argues that a popular account of intentions can be extended to beliefs. Beliefs are stabl...
I argue that one should not confuse two issues about the relationship between belief and the will: t...
I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible an...
One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that th...
Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and jus...
The author argues that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense p...
Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe. Yet we don’t ...
I defend the view that we act “under the guise of the good.” More specifically, I argue that an inte...
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or...
This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of be...
I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the...