Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the decision maker. When each outcome in a random variable is compared with the parallel outcome in an alternative random variable, regret preferences are transitive iff they are expected utility. In this paper we show that when the choice set consists of pairwise statistically independent lotteries and the regret associated with each outcome is with respect to the entire alternative distribution, then transitive regret-based behavior is consistent with betweenness preferences and with a family of preferences that is characterized by a consistency property. Examples of consistent preferences include CARA, CRRA, and anticipated utility. © 2014 Elsevier Inc
This paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how such concept...
As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic...
In this work we consider preference relations that might not be total. Partial preferences may be he...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Prefer...
Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives for-gone by the decision...
We study a sufficiently general regret criterion for choosing between two probabilistic lotteries. F...
Several models of decision-making imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. Our exp...
The regret theory of choice under uncertainty proposed by Loomes and Sugden has performed well in ex...
This paper introduces a method to measure regret theory, a popular theory of decision under uncertai...
Transitive preference, that is, if you prefer apples to bananas and bananas to cherries, you also pr...
This paper introduces a method to measure regret theory, a popular theory of decision under uncertai...
Several models of choice under uncertainty imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference...
A significant body of experimental evidence documents systematic violations of the transitivity axio...
We assume that the ex-post utility of an agent facing a menu of lotteries depends upon the actual pa...
The paper provides a behavioural explanation for ambiguity aversion based on the fear of regret. We ...
This paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how such concept...
As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic...
In this work we consider preference relations that might not be total. Partial preferences may be he...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Prefer...
Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives for-gone by the decision...
We study a sufficiently general regret criterion for choosing between two probabilistic lotteries. F...
Several models of decision-making imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. Our exp...
The regret theory of choice under uncertainty proposed by Loomes and Sugden has performed well in ex...
This paper introduces a method to measure regret theory, a popular theory of decision under uncertai...
Transitive preference, that is, if you prefer apples to bananas and bananas to cherries, you also pr...
This paper introduces a method to measure regret theory, a popular theory of decision under uncertai...
Several models of choice under uncertainty imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference...
A significant body of experimental evidence documents systematic violations of the transitivity axio...
We assume that the ex-post utility of an agent facing a menu of lotteries depends upon the actual pa...
The paper provides a behavioural explanation for ambiguity aversion based on the fear of regret. We ...
This paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how such concept...
As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic...
In this work we consider preference relations that might not be total. Partial preferences may be he...