Political accountability at the local level in Tanzania

In this dissertation, I analyze political accountability at the local level in Tanzania. I argue that two factors, (1) political and party institutions, and (2) sources of finance strongly influence the ability and incentive of locally elected officials to act in the interests of their constituents. I show that the country's political and party institutions allocate minimal power to local representatives and that they encounter strong motivations to undertake projects which reflect the priorities of the central government as well as those of their own electorate. I further find that the principal factor that determines variation in the ability and incentive of locally elected officials to act in the interests of their voters are the sources of local government revenue. Employing an empirical analysis of detailed data on taxes, expenditures, transfers, and projects at the local level in Tanzania, I observe that local governments with a sizable tax base enjoy greater autonomy from the central government, produce more services for their constituents from local revenue, and tax residents of their jurisdiction more benevolently than their less financially autonomous counterpart